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ABSTRACT 
 
Executive compensation is increasingly becoming a target by media, shareholders, and 
government regulators. Excessive or poorly structured compensation arrangements have been 
blamed for the U.S. financial crisis of 2008 and it has been questioned why executives were 
being paid out the bonuses and other benefits even though their companies were losing 
shareholder value. Agency theory explains part of the problem is due to the separation of 
management from ownership. This study investigated the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance in the restaurant industry. 
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INTRODCUTION  
 
Executive compensation, how and how much, is increasingly becoming a target by 
media, shareholders, and government regulators. It has been questioned why executives are 
receiving the bonuses and other benefits even though their companies are losing shareholder 
value. Part of the problem is due to the separation of management from ownership. Managers 
have incentives to pursue self-serving goals that may not maximize the shareholder value. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) emphasized that managers will make operating decisions that maximize his 
utility in the form of pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. Because the shareholders do not often 
have enough information regarding the managers’ activities, it is difficult to verify whether 
managers are acting in the best interest of the shareholders. It has been theorized that using 
equity-based compensation ties executives’ wealth to the stock price, therefore, motivates 
executives to align their own interests with the shareholders’ interests (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). However, Walker (2010) indicated that using stock options has contributed to the shift in 
executives’ focus on short-term gains, rather than longer-term outlook. Further, Mehran (1995) 
stated that there is little empirical evidence on whether corporations using more equity-based 
compensation perform better.  
 
Agency theory seeks to determine most efficient contract governing the manager-
shareholder relationship. Specifically, the question is a behavior-oriented contract (e.g., salaries) 
more efficient than an outcome-oriented contract (e.g., ownership, stock options) affecting firm 
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
According to Sturman (2001) service industries provided lowest average salary, short-
term bonuses, and long-term bonuses among all the industries tallied to their executives. In 
addition, a recent study reported that restaurant industry used more behavior-oriented 
compensation than outcome-oriented compensation (Barber, Ghiselli, & Deale, 2006). As agency 
theory indicates, using short-term incentive compensation may not align managerial interests 
with shareholder interests. Prior studies examining the executive compensation in the restaurant 
industry focused on single reward, either pay and performance (Kim & Gu, 2005; Madanoglu & 
Karadag, 2008) or managerial ownership and performance (Park & Jang, 2010). However, the 
executives usually are compensated through multiple rewards such as stock options, salary, and 
bonuses (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Financial performance is widely used as an indicator of business performance. It is 
generally suggested that a compensation system based on managerial performance would be a 
better solution because perfect monitoring may be impossible or too expensive (Kim & Gu, 
2005). Therefore, developing appropriate performance measures and interpreting the outcomes 
are central to the issue of organizational control. Profitability is the most commonly used basis 
for defining success, however; found to be short run oriented measure (Phillips, 1999). Although, 
economic value added (EVA) was proposed as an overall measure of financial performance that 
is intended to represent a firm’s true performance (Lee & Kim, 2009), Otley (1999) argued that it 
is particularly weak in measuring and monitoring the means by which managers have adopted to 
achieve their overall objectives. In order to reflect both accounting performance measures and 
shareholders’ future expectations on firms Tobin’s q has been employed to explain a number of 
diverse corporate phenomena (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). It is defined as the ratio of the 
market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its assets; it reflects both accounting 
performance measures and investors’ future expectation on firms.  
 
The purpose of this study was threefold: first, to investigate the relationship between 
executive compensation and restaurant firm performance; second, to investigate which form of 
compensation, or combination, contributes more to the firm performance; and third, to determine 
whether level of compensation affects firm performance. This study adds value as it uses 
different methodology, panel data, and uses a larger sample with a longer time period than prior 
studies. In addition, this study includes additional determinants indicated by the literature to gain 
better insights into the relationship.  
 
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
 
The sample for this study is the publicly traded restaurant companies in the U.S. The ten 
year (1999-2009) annual financial and executive compensation data on those firms is obtained 
from COMPUSTAT database.  
 
Overall firm performance was measured using a modified version of the Tobin’s q 
following Chung and Puritt formula (1994). Chung and Puritt (1994) approximation of Tobin’s q 
was chosen for its simplicity and data availability, yet the model found to explain at least 96.6% 
of the variability in Tobin’s q. Approximate q defined as:  
approximate Q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA  (1) 
where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the number of common stock shares 
outstanding, PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the 
value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets, plus the book value of the 
firm’s long-term debt, and TA is the book value of the total assets of the firm.  
 
A regression model (see equation 2) was adopted in this study to investigate the 
relationship between firm performance and executive compensation. Firm performance is the 
dependent variable and the independent variables are described below. Size was included as a 
controlling variable to reflect the size effects of the firm and was measured using total revenue of 
the firm. 
 
FPit = β0 + β1Sit + β2Bit + β3RSit + β4SOit + β5NONit + β6OCit + β7TCit + β8Sizeit + εit  (2) 
(i = 1, 2, …, N; t = 1, 2, …, T) 
 
Table 1 
Variable Description 
Variable Description 
FP Firm Performance, Tobin’s Q 
S Salary 
B Bonus 
RS Restricted Stock Grants 
SO Stock Options (Fair Market Value) 
NON Non-equity Compensation 
OC Other Compensation 
TC Total Compensation 
Size Size, Total Revenue 
 
Panel data methodology was chosen for this study as pooling regression ignores the 
individual firm effects (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005 2005). Himmelberg et al. (1999) emphasized 
that environment in which compensation contracts take place differs across firms in both 
observable and unobservable ways.  
Fixed-effects model 
FPit = (αi + uit) + β1Sit + β2Bit + β3RSit + β4SOit + β5NONit + β6OCit + β7TCit + β8Sizeit (3) 
Random-effects model 
FPit = αi + β1Sit + β2Bit + β3RSit + β4SOit + β5NONit + β6OCit + β7TCit + β8Sizeit + (uit + vit) (4) 
where αi is the unknown intercept for each firm, and uit is the error term.  
 
Two statistical tests were performed to identify which empirical methodology, pooling, 
random effect, or fixed effect regression, is most suitable. Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test 
(Breusch & Pagan, 1980) of the random effect model and the Hausman specification test to 
compare the fixed effect and random effect models (Hausman, 1978).  
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